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This study attempted to determine how the Mark Johnson model for utility 
maximization in a multi-attribute environment could be used in DOD contracting to 
increase the overall gain or benefit to the government. It was established that as the 
Department of Defense budget decreases, increased emphasis has been placed on 
acquisition reform. In order for the reforms to achieve an efficient solution, the 
objectives the military should be accomplishing can not be overlooked. The Mark 
Johnson model was introduced as a mechanism that examined all of the critical areas 
that impact effectiveness and provided a means for maximizing this effectiveness in 
the most efficient way. The study indicated four areas in which the examination of 
multiple attributes via the Mark Johnson mechanism could prove beneficial to the 
government. The research also examined the criteria for selecting key attributes and 
the methodolgy for deteraiining their tradeoff values. The research concluded that in 
the presence of adequate competition, this mechanism could prove to be a valuable 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
As the Department of Defense (DOD) budget decreases, 
increased emphasis has been placed on acquisition reform. The 
idea behind this reform is to streamline the acquisition 
process in order to receive the largest possible gain from the 
funds that are spent. Unfortunately, the drive to reduce 
funds has often occurred at the expense of being able to carry- 
out the mission. In order for the reforms to achieve an 
efficient solution, the object of what we should be 
accomplishing can not be overlooked. Only by examining all of 
the critical areas that impact the effectiveness of DOD 
expenditures can the utility or overall gain of the government 
be maximized. This thesis studies mechanisms that consider 
multiple- attributes in this gain maximization focusing 
specifically on the work done by Mark Johnson. 
The economic model developed by Mark Johnson attempts to 
maximize the effectiveness of DOD expenditures by clearly 
defining the key attributes that give benefit to the 
government and allowing flexibility in the achievement of 
those attributes.  [Ref. 1] 
B. OBJECTIVE 
This study focuses on analyzing the criteria necessary 
for realistically using the Mark Johnson model for increasing 
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both the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD expenditures. It 
also discusses the use of other multi-attribute models and the 
criteria required for their implementation. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The principal research question was: How can the Mark 
Johnson model be used in DOD contracting to increase the 
overall gain to the government? 
Subsidiary research questions were: 
1. What attributes should be considered key to a 
project? 
2. How can a relationship between the key elements be 
defined? 
3. Will streamlined contracting methods affect the 
availability of DOD contractors in the long run? 
4. Can the Baron/Myerson truth telling model be used 
with multiple attributes? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study examines the current acquisition reform 
initiatives and their emphasis on maximizing the gain for 
every dollar spent. It specifically addresses the need for 
mechanisms that can achieve the highest level of gain or 
utility by determining all of the key attributes that add 
benefit. Although many mechanisms have potential for this 
type of analysis, this thesis specifically examines the 
applicability of the Mark Johnson model.  There are several 
both t e eff t ess and eff  of DOD expenditures. It 
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points in the procurement process in which multi-attribute 
analysis employed via the Mark Johnson mechanism can be 
employed, however, many considerations must be made before 
acting on these suppositions. Specific imperatives for the 
successful implementation of the mechanism are also addressed. 
The applicability of the .Baron/Myerson model is examined 
due to its capability of achieving truthful information from 
contractors with its incentive compatibility structure. Due 
to the analyses performed in previous theses, this mechanism 
is not examined at length, but only in cursory form as it 
applies to the multiple attribute traits. 
E.   ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II presents the background for current 
acquisition reform initiatives. It discusses the various 
mechanisms being developed to increase the caliber of the 
acquisition process and the work that has gone on before to 
utilize these mechanisms. 
Chapter III examines multi-attribute models through the 
introduction of the Baron/Myerson model and the Mark Johnson 
model. The underlying principles of each model are discussed 
and then an example application of each is given with 
graphical representations of their implication via a contract 
award. 
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Chapter IV analyzes the applicability of the Mark Johnson 
model by examining four areas of potential usage. Under each 
area, an example is given with the accompanying pitfalls of 
utilization. It also details some of the implementation 
issues and concludes with a long range outlook. 
Chapter V answers the research questions and presents the 
conclusions and recommendations. It also addresses areas of 
potential future research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
Winston Churchill once stated "As it is, those who can 
win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who 
could make a good peace would never have won the war." [Ref. 
2] As the conclusion of the Cold War is still being written 
into the history books, the United States is struggling with 
the transition into making peace. During war time, the old 
adage of sparing no expense in order to successfully 
accomplish the mission is commonplace. However, in settling 
into peace, the cost of national defense becomes ever more 
scrutinized. 
Since the mid 1980's, the appropriations for defense 
procurement and other contracting venues have been drastically 
reduced. In order to continue to accomplish the mission, the 
inefficiencies associated with completing the task without 
regards to the cost must be curtailed. To this end, 
acquisition reform is being pushed from the White House down 
to the lowest levels of the Department of Defense. 
By eliminating inefficiencies, it is assumed that the 
continuance of peace can be achieved at a reasonable price. 
The fallacy in this assumption becomes apparent when the drive 
for efficiency overcomes the requirement for effectiveness. 
.
. NT
inst hurchill u ,
i  ar ell a  ce,
l a  oul r ar. ef.
s cl ol ar rit
i ks, nit t t ru l it
io aki ce. uri ar i ,
r essf l
pli is monplace. owever, t in
ce, st t l es r or
t .
i i 80's, r pri t
ent r t t r st l
. r t pli issi ,
e i it pleti it t
st ust rt i . ,
uisi form rom hit ous
est l epart ent efense.
i i t i s, su t
t n t  l ri .
lac pti es ar t he
cien es re t ss.
5 
The successful implementors of a peace strategy must also 
consider the achievements that allowed for the success of 
their predecessors during war. 
This chapter will present the background for the current 
acquisition reform initiatives. It will discuss the ongoing 
efforts to develop useful mechanisms for increasing the 
caliber of the acquisition process and the implementation of 
some of these mechanisms. 
B.   ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES 
On October 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. The 
goal of FASA is to speed up and modernize the acquisition 
process by removing some of the burdensome requirements. 
Three features of FASA are likely to have major impacts on the 
acquisition process. [Ref. 3] 
1.   Simplified Acquisition Threshold 
All acquisitions that are less than $100,000 now have 
special status in that the degree of oversight required is 
greatly diminished. This will affect over 9 0% of the DOD 
contracts [Ref. 3] . By making many laws inapplicable to 
contracts in this range and simplifying the acquisition 
procedures, real benefits can be gained. 
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2. Commercial Items 
FASA broadened the definition of commercial items, 
allowing for more rapid procurement from commercial vendors at 
lower costs. This will allow for the purchase of off-the- 
shelf items without rigorous governmental inspection and 
testing requirements. 
3. Truth in Negotiations Act 
From its inception, there has been a prediction that the 
Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) would increase administrative 
costs. Recent studies have confirmed this. One study- 
estimates that the entire regulatory system adds 10 to 50 
percent to the cost of doing business with the government 
[Ref. 4] . The new rules set forth in FASA will limit the 
necessity of TINA and will rationalize the need for its 
incorporation. 
C.   MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST 
The entire acquisition process, including contracting 
methods, procurement, major weapon systems, etc. include a 
plethora of regulations that dictate what the government can 
and cannot do and what the contractor shall and shall not do. 
The FASA should alleviate many of these requirements, however, 
due to the nature of federal procurement, some must still 
stand. 
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1. Waste, Fraud and Abuse 
When the costs to track and maintain the integrity of a 
system exceeds the cost of the system, the public outcry 
regarding waste, fraud, and abuse is understandable.  However 
the very nature of spending public funds dictates the need for 
increased regulation in order to minimize the risk of fraud. 
Here the tradeoff between the waste incurred by excessive 
regulations must be weighed with the possibility/probability 
of the loss due to fraud.  Peter DeMayo, vice president for 
contract policy at Lockheed Martin Corporation said that 
The system is ^overloaded' with mechanisms aimed at 
preventing fraud, waste, and abuse. There is 
little time or incentive to be innovative or to 
exercise judgment. It is understandable that few 
are willing to exercise flexibility at the risk of 
shortening their careers. [Ref. 5] 
Regulatory requirements that stymy innovation in the name of 
public interest are self-serving at best. 
2. Source Selection 
Due to the risk averse nature of DOD in some critical 
areas, awarding a contract based solely on the lowest price is 
not always a prudent decision. When the need for successful 
completion of the project is the overriding concern, source 
selection is often used. Source selection allows the 
government to select firms that have established themselves 
and have some minimum of proven technical expertise. However, 
an adequate number of firms must be selected in order to 
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maintain competition in accordance with the Competition in 
Contracting Act [Ref. 6]. 
An area that uses source selection exclusively is 
contracting  for  professional  services.    This  applies 
specifically to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
(NAVFAC) in its award of design contracts to Architect and 
Engineering firms.  These contracts are considered critical 
because of the impact the designs created by them can have on 
the cost of the final construction project.  Although the cost 
of the design effort is limited to 6 percent of the overall 
project cost, problems resulting from their deficiencies can 
boost the total project cost ten times or can even result in 
the inability to complete the project at all.  To minimize 
this  risk,  the Brooks Architect and Engineer Act was 
established stating 
The Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of 
the Federal Government to publicly announce all 
requirements for Architect and Engineering 
services, and to negotiate contracts for Architect 
and Engineering services on the basis of 
demonstrated competence and qualification for the 
type of professional services required and at a 
fair and reasonable price. [Ref. 7] 
The purpose of this act was to allow Architect and Engineering 
services contracts to be awarded based solely on technical 
expertise.  Price was to be considered a secondary aspect, 
negotiated only after the "best" firm had been selected.  It 
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was assumed that this would eliminate the risk of poor 
performance and thereby decrease the overall risk to the DOD. 
D.   DOD'S IMPLEMENTATION OF FASA 
Although the implications of FASA are still being 
resolved, the DOD has not sat back on its laurels waiting for 
direction. In fact, the DOD has taken FASA one step further. 
Secretary of Defense Perry signed a directive eliminating 
military specifications and standards and mandated the use of 
performance based specifications. This is in stark contrast 
to the old acquisition system. 
1. Performance Based Service Contracts 
Over $100 billion per year is spent by the federal 
government for service contracts. The Agencies' Service 
Contracting Practices Summary Report of January 1994 found 
government-wide problems regarding contractual statements of 
work, contract administration and cost effectiveness in these 
programs. For this reason, the Office of Management and 
Budget asked all federal agencies to: 
• Make a formal endorsement of performance-based 
service contracting as the preferred methodology 
for acquiring services by contract 
• Make a voluntary pledge to convert self-selected 
service contracts (preferably recurring) to 
performance-based 
• Establish a high-level, agency wide task force to 
develop and manage the implementation of 
performance-based service contracting 
10 
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• Select a senior level point of contact who will 
represent the agency on performance-based 
contracting matters [Ref. 8] 
NAVFAC recognized the benefits of performance-based 
service contracting as early as 1980. They spearheaded 
several initiatives including the development of guide 
performance work statements and standard training courses for 
writing performance work statements and quality assurance 
plans. The requirement for a Schedule of Deductions along 
with the quality assurance plan has proven to be an equitable 
and effective means for enhancing contractor performance. 
NAVFACs experience in this field is being transferred 
throughout the federal government through briefings presented 
to representatives of 26 federal agencies. The overriding 
goal of this commitment is to achieve quality performance 
through efficient means. They are not only looking at 
decreasing the amount of money they spend for service 
contracting, but also looking to increase the amount of 
performance they get out of the contractors. 
2.   Shifting Towards Quality 
While austerity is driving the need for efficiency, the 
demand for quality is also escalating. Several studies have 
been done on the tradeoffs of increasing quality. Bensen and 
Terasawa examined the effects of performance incentives in the 
two stage major system acquisition process.   By dividing 
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expenditures into the two distinct categories of Research and 
Development (R&D) and Production, and incentivizing each 
phase, alternate reimbursement schedules were created. 
Increased expenditures on R&D in the first phase could both 
increase performance in the first phase and reduce production 
costs in the second phase. Their model found that by 
including a term corresponding to the government's share of 
cost overruns, the tendency for systems to exceed performance 
minimums but result in cost overruns could be demonstrated. 
[Ref. 9] 
When competition is introduced in the second phase, and 
the demand curve is altered by reducing the quantity demanded 
more than is justified in response to higher prices, it was 
found that the competing firms would report their costs more 
truthfully. This revelation would result in a greater surplus 
to the government and hence a higher utility. 
E.   ACHIEVING EFFECTIVENESS 
Increasing efficiency is required in a downsizing 
environment. However, the goal should also be to achieve the 
mission. In order to accomplish the mission, the correct 
tools must be available. The correctness of those tools can 
only be determined through analyzing the effectiveness of the 
various systems throughout the DOD. The military could have 
extremely cost efficient weapons in the arsenal that are so 
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archaic or of such low quality that they cannot fulfill the 
mission. To be able to analyze the effectiveness, all of the 
attributes that make up the effectiveness of the item must be 
considered. Many feel that this means that price should not 
be considered. This should not be the case. Price can be 
considered an attribute in the makeup of the good. All of the 
attributes including price, quality, reliability, timeliness, 
quantity, etc. should be considered. 
F.   EVALUATING MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES 
In the Bensen/Terasawa model, they were dealing with 
quality, price and quantity, evaluating the tradeoffs between 
these multiple attributes. Mechanisms for maximizing the 
benefit from these attributes is the basis of multiple 
attribute analysis. 
1.   Markov Analysis 
A basic implementation of this analysis can be found in 
Markov Analysis. This analysis is based on probabilistic 
occurrence of each action. All combinations of possible 
outcomes are first ascertained and then their probability of 
occurrence are determined. The attributes that do not have 
distinct values but are instead continuous (such as quality), 
need to be broken into discrete values in order to employ this 
mechanism. By establishing thresholds, these attributes can 
be broken into distinct ranges and thereby used in this type 
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of analysis. The goal of using Markov Analysis is to maximize 
the expected gain. This gain is found by multiplying the 
benefit of each the possible combinations by their probability 
of occurrence and summing them. [Ref. 10] 
2.   Baron/Myerson 
Following heavily in this vain is the work done by David 
Baron and Roger Myerson. Their work centered around 
regulating a monopolist with the goal being to receive the 
highest expected gain from the producer. This gain was 
achieved by regulating a utility company or entity that has a 
natural monopoly. In these cases, a monopolist would set 
their prices to achieve a maximum profit. As long as the 
regulators do not know the actual costs, price setting will 
generally occur. When the actual costs are readily available, 
the regulator can ascertain a fair profit, but receiving 
truthful costs is unlikely due to the disincentives of firms 
to provide that information. To increase the consumers 
expected gain, Baron and Myerson altered the demand curve and 
paid the contractor based on this altered demand curve and the 
consumer surplus it generated. This achieved incentive 
compatibility because the contractor received the most profit 
when his actual costs were used in the new demand function. 
By reporting higher or lower costs, the quantity demanded and 
the surplus paid would result in a lower profit level.  When 
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the consumer is the government, such as when the government is 
forced into a sole source arrangement, this mechanism can be 
employed to maximize the government's expected gain. [Ref. 11] 
David Bearden applied the Baron/Myerson model to 
government procurement in determining whether it could be used 
as a price regulating tool under a price-based procurement 
process. His findings were that the model could be of use in 
monopolistic situations as long as the government's demand 
curve was actually flexible. [Ref. 12] 
3.   Mark Johnson 
In order to accomplish both efficiency and effectiveness, 
it is crucial that the government tell the contractor what 
they are really trying to purchase and why, as opposed to 
specifying how everything is to be done and not allowing the 
contractor the flexibility to optimize on what is desired. 
Mark Johnson realized the nonoptimality of this and developed 
a model that was both incentive compatible and allowed for the 
efficient allocation of resources in order to achieve the 
maximum benefit as derived from the key elements. [Ref. 1] 
His work was based on the idea that key attributes could 
be identified and the relationship amongst them could be 
determined. By indicating these key attributes and their 
relationship to the contractor, the risk of spending time, 
money, and effort on items that are not optimally adding 
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benefit to the government can be minimized. If the government 
looks strictly at price, as is often the case, then the 
contractor will give the bare minimum in all of the other 
areas because they add cost to the contractor, but do not give 
him any corresponding benefit from those additions. The bare 
minimum is generally specified; however, what is not specified 
is the tradeoff of an increase in any of those items beyond 
the minimum. Specifying minimums and maximums is often 
necessary, but having no incentive to go beyond these often 
results in a non-optimized solution. 
Mark Johnson found that by publishing a utility function 
based on the government's expected benefits and allowing the 
contractor the flexibility to maximize this utility, the 
overall utility to the government is increased. 
G.   CONCLUSION 
Proper implementation of FASA should give the acquisition 
process the much needed transfiguration it needs. Looking 
beyond this requires the foresight to understand that in this 
time of relative peace, effectiveness can not give way 
entirely to efficiency. Only by having an optimal balance of 
these two attributes can the military continue to function in 
maintaining the peace as well as preparing for the next 
conflict. The only way to truly optimize effectiveness is to 
identify the key attributes that give benefit and maintain 
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flexibility in these attributes in order to maximize their 
combination. To address the issue of achieving effectiveness, 
multi-attribute models that have been developed for this 
purpose will be examined. 
17 
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III.  MULTI-ATTRIBUTE MODELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Several models have been developed recently attempting to 
achieve maximization of the utility or benefit gained when 
multiple attributes are considered key to the success of a 
contract or program. 
Baron and Myerson did extensive work at maximizing the 
total social welfare generated when a monopolist exists in an 
asymmetric information environment. Their work concentrated 
on the sole attributes of price and quantity, but serves as a 
starting point for analyzing utilities generated by these two 
attributes. 
Mark Johnson developed an economic model for maximizing 
the overall utility of a buyer even when the exact costs are 
unknown to the purchaser. His model is more encompassing and 
can be applied with a plethora of key attributes. 
This chapter explains the origin and underlying 
principles of each model. It shows the advantages of the 
models given certain criteria. Finally, it concludes with an 
example of the application of each model via a contract award. 
B. THE BARON-MYERSON MODEL 
Baron and Myerson constructed an economic model for 
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of this model was to maximize the total surplus generated 
thereby increasing social welfare. This model also has 
potential use for maximizing the government's expected gain 
when multiple attributes are considered. This mechanism uses 
only price and quantity as the key attributes, but can be 
quite useful in achieving maximum gain or utility to the 
government in areas with little or no competition. The key to 
the model is the alteration of the government's purchasing 
plan based on the costs claimed by the contractor. 
1.   The Contractor's Motivation 
Within the Baron-Myerson framework, the government's goal 
is to achieve truth-telling from the contractor in order to 
minimize the deadweight loss associated with normal 
monopolistic practices. In order to achieve this truth- 
telling, the Government pays all of the contractor's reported 
costs and gives a bonus of consumer surplus between the cost 
and the altered demand function. The contractor is enticed 
into telling the truth about his costs because he will 
maximize his total profit when he does. By reporting a lower 
than actual cost, he will be required to produce some items at 
a loss, decreasing his profits. By reporting higher than 
actual costs, he will be losing some of his possible profit 
because not as many units will be ordered. Only by telling 
the truth can he maximize his total profit. 
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2. The Government's Motivation 
By receiving truthful information from the contractor, 
the government can adapt its schedule to maximize the utility- 
gained by the government from the combination of the 
attributes of quantity and price. The form the revised demand 
function takes depends largely on the relationship between 
these two attributes and on the expected probability of 
distribution of the contractor's costs. By providing a more 
elastic demand function to the contractor, the government can 
maximize its expected gain and ideally its expected utility. 
3. Determining the Revised Demand Function 
Although many variations of the distribution of costs are 
possible, previous research has shown that no single 
assumption for distribution gives a dominant strategy. 
Therefore, as an example for later comparison, a Uniform 
probability distribution of possible costs will be used. 
This implies that the government believes that any cost 
is equally likely. The government would then choose the lower 
and upper cost values based on its estimates, and create an 
effective demand curve that will maximize the government's 
expected gain. 
C.   THE MARK JOHNSON MODEL 
Mark Johnson developed an economic model for maximizing 
the overall utility of a buyer even when the exact costs are 
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unknown to the purchaser. The objective of the purchaser 
(Government) using the Mark Johnson model is to maximize the 
total utility gained from the purchase by using a function of 
the key elements that derive benefit to the government. These 
key elements can be anything ranging from quality to design 
features to timeliness to price. By defining the relationship 
between these key elements, the government allows the 
contractor to maximize his well-being (profit) while also 
maximizing the government's utility. This idealistic goal 
congruence yields incentive compatibility which is a necessary 
trait in efficient government contracting. 
The model assumes that there are definable attributes 
other than price that yield benefit to the government and that 
a relationship between these attributes can be specified by 
the government. 
1.   Origin of the Model 
Several authors have analyzed the tradeoffs inherent in 
multidimensional bidding mechanisms. Their common links have 
been the information asymmetry between a buyer and the 
potential suppliers. While the buyer generally knows what he 
wants, he does not know what the sellers are capable of, and 
the sellers, though knowledgeable of their own capabilities, 
have varying degrees of understanding of what the buyer wants. 
This differs from the standard auction framework.  Because of 
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this, standard bidding procedures designed to operate in the 
one-dimensional environment (that of price) do not operate 
efficiently in this more complex setting. 
Mark Johnson realized that most of the work done in this 
area was in detailing the failings of the existing bidding 
procedures (auctions) in these more complex situations. He 
decided instead to focus on the design of bidding mechanisms 
that retained their desirable properties even in the complex 
multidimensional setting. 
In his research, he found that incentive compatibility- 
was key to realizing an efficient outcome. He also realized 
that giving the contractor flexibility in those dimensions 
would allow the contractor to maximize his output with the 
minimum of effort, thereby creating the greatest gain for both 
parties by telling the truth. 
2.   Principles of the Model 
One of the problems with any contractual system is 
receiving accurate bids from the potential contractors. As 
contractors conduct their business on the premise that they 
will receive profits, it is not uncommon for hedging to occur 
in order to maximize those profits. In order for the 
government to receive the best possible utility out of the 
contract, it is not necessary for the government to know all 
of the contractors' opportunity costs, or even the tradeoff 
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costs for the key attributes. It is, however, necessary for 
the contractors to be truthful in their bidding of what they 
can actually provide. To that end, the Mark Johnson mechanism 
incorporates a Second Sealed Bid Auction (SSBA), commonly 
referred to as a Vickrey Auction. 
The Vickrey Auction consists of two stages, that of 
bidding and of awarding. The format is that the government 
announces a multidimensional evaluation function (a 
quantitative function based on the key attributes) that 
establishes the "value" of each of those attributes to the 
government. The contractors then bid on the contract giving 
their "best" value derived by that function, with the high- 
value firm being awarded the contract. The award, however, is 
based on the value submitted by the second highest bidder, 
thereby achieving truthful bidding from the contractors. 
The contractors will be truthful in their bidding, 
because over or underbidding their actual utility will not 
benefit them. An example may prove useful in demonstrating 
this phenomenon. 
3.   Example of Vickrey Auction for Truth Telling 
To simplify this example, we will assume that there are 
only two contractors. Given that each contractor has a choice 
between 1) telling the truth, 2) overbidding and 3) 
underbidding, we will examine the impacts of each to determine 
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what will be in the contractor's best interest. For each of 
these possibilities, the competing contractor can also tell 
the truth, overbid, or underbid. In this example, it will be 
assumed that the actual maximum utility attainable for 
contractor I is 100 while that for contractor II is 90. 
Table 3-1 shows the possible outcomes of the auction 
under the nine possible scenarios. 
II 
Tells Truth 
Utility = 100 
Underbids 
Utility = 85 
Overbids 
Utility = 115 
Tells Truth 
















Table 3-1.  Net Utility Gain as a Function of 
Differing Strategies 
The table shows the added utility gained (or lost) through the 
strategy employed by each of the two contractors.  As an 
example, the cell Tells Truth/Tells Truth indicates that if 
this  strategy was  employed by both  contractors,  then 
contractor I would have an added utility of 10 (the contractor 
only has to provide a utility of 90, however, he can produce 
up to 100 and still maintatin his profit reservation level). 
Contractor II would have an added utility of 0 because he 
would not be awarded the contract. 
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As can be seen, a dominant strategy does exist for 
contractor I, that of telling the truth (with contractor I's 
utility gains being indicated by shadowing). By overbidding, 
contractor I will be awarded the contract, however there is a 
possibility that he will be required to provide a utility 
beyond his capability. This would occur in the cell 
Overbid/Overbid and would result in a loss of 5 in utility 
(contractor I must provide a utility of 105, however he is 
only capable of producing a utility of 100 given his profit 
reservation level, therefore he must lose profit in order to 
come up with the additional utility) . By underbidding, 
contractor I will not be awarded the contract when contractor 
II tells the truth. 
Contractor II also has a dominant strategy in telling the 
truth (with contractor II's utility gains being indicated by 
shadowing). Underbidding would not allow him to be awarded 
the contract, and overbidding may require that he perform 
beyond his capability. This would occur in the cell Tells 
Truth/Overbid and would result in a loss of 10 in utility 
(contractor II must provide a utility of 100, however he is 
only capable of producing a utility of 90 given his profit 
reservation level, therefore he must lose profit in order to 
come up with the additional utility) . There is the chance 
that while overbidding, contractor II may still be awarded the 
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contract at a level he can perform, however, he would also 
have been awarded the contract had he told the truth about his 
abilities. Therefore, the dominant strategy of truth-telling 
exists for both contractors. 
Thus, the SSBA entices the contractors to tell the truth 
about the utility they can generate for the government. To 
better understand the application of the utility function and 
how it differs from the standard award mechanisms and the 
method in which a contractor will derive his bid, an example 
of a simple award will be given. 
D.   AWARDING A CONTRACT 
To give meaning to the terms defined earlier, an example 
of the application of both of the models will be given to 
demonstrate their characteristics in a qualitative sense. 
Both examples will assume that a contract will be awarded for 
the delivery of some goods. The Baron/Myerson example will be 
applied to goods with a flexible quantity and a monopolistic 
type of contractor base. The Mark Johnson example will be 
applied to goods with a flexible delivery date with 
competitive contractors. 
1.   Under the Baron/Myerson Model 
For this example, the following assumptions will be made: 
The government Demand = 600 - 10P (P is price per unit) 
Minimum expected cost = $5.00 per unit 
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Contractor I's actual marginal cost = $10.00 per unit 
Using these assumptions, the Baron/Myerson model would yield 
a revised demand curve of Demand = 660 - 22P from P = 5 to 30 
and Demand = 600 - 10P with P < 5 (an unexpected value) . 
Given that the contractor wants to maximize his profit, he 
would realize that by announcing a cost of $10.00 (his true 
cost), he would achieve that maximization as shown in Figure 
3-1. At an announced cost of $10.00 the contract award would 
be made for a quantity of 440 units being produced at a price 
to the government of the contractor's actual costs (440*10 = 
$4400) plus a bonus of the consumer surplus generated by the 
revised demand curve (20 * 440 * % = $4400) for a total of 
$8 800 as shown in Figure 3-2. Thus the bonus or cost of 
getting the contractor to tell the truth was $4400. Although 
this may seem excessive, the government's gain which is equal 
to the consumers surplus under the original demand curve minus 
the surplus paid to the contractor would be $7920 (& * (50 + 
6) * 440 - 4400) . This is noticeably higher than the $3125 (^ 
* 25 * 25 0) gain achieved by the government when the 
contractor acts as a monopolist without a truth-telling 
mechanism. 
2.   Under the Mark Johnson Model 
Although all government acquisitions have many attributes 
which add to their utility, for simplicity only the attributes 
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of price and timeliness of delivery will be considered. If 
the contractor's sole compensation is monetary, then he will 
produce at the timeliness most convenient for himself, and 
will not take the government's utility of that timeliness into 
consideration. If maximum allowable times are stated, then 
the contractor will most likely deliver at that maximum 
allowable time. 
In this example the government's utility function, the 
government's demand function, the contractor's profit 
functions and the contractor's reservation levels for profit 
will all be treated as given. It will then be shown what will 
happen using a naive contracting approach of no strategy 
versus employing the Mark Johnson mechanism.  Given that: 
Government utility function is U = (60 - P) * (91 - T) 
(where P is price per unit and T is time in days) 
Maximum allowable delivery time is within 90 days 
Contractor I Profit = (P - 30) + (T - 50) 
Reservation level of Profit = $50 (minimum profit) 
Contractor II Profit = (P - 40) * (T - 30) 
Reservation level of Profit = $100 (minimum profit) 
The contractor's profit functions are based on their 
technology levels and differ due to their expertise or 
experience  in  the  specific  contracting  areas.    Their 
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reservations  levels  for profit  depend  on  the  various 
opportunity costs they face at the time of the contract. 
Under the naive approach, assuming that there is 
sufficient competition to force the contractors to go for 
their minimum profit reservation levels, we find that both 
contractors will take the maximum time allowed as stated 
earlier, which in this case is 90 days. Solving each equation 
for P given the profit reservation levels results in 
contractor I bidding a price of $40 (P = 50 + 30 - 90 + 50) 
and contractor II bidding a price of $41.67 (P = 100/(90 - 30) 
+ 40) . In this case, contractor I will be awarded the 
contract at a price of $40 giving a utility of 20 ((60 - 
40)*(91 - 90)) to the government. This of course assumes that 
the contractors are absolutely truthful in their reporting of 
actual costs and is a "best case" scenario with regards to the 
naive contracting approach. 
Using the Mark Johnson mechanism, we first need to 
determine what each contractor will bid. Because the second- 
price type auction is being used, we see that each contractor 
will tell the truth about his anticipated costs, so each will 
determine the maximum utility they can bid while still 
achieving their profit reservation levels. 
To accomplish this, the objective function of contractor 
I would be: 
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Max U = (60 - P) * (91 - T) 
s.t. (P - 30) + (T - 50) = 50 
Solving this graphically in Figure 3-3 yields U = 110 with P 
= $50, T = 80. 
The objective function of contractor II would be: 
Max U = (60 - P) * (91 - T) 
s.t.  (P - 40)*(T - 30) = 100 
Solving this graphically in Figure 3-3 yields U = 621 with P 
= $45.90, T = 47. 
By this example, contractor II would be awarded the 
contract because of his higher utility bid of 621. The 
contractor would, however only be required to provide the 
utility bid by the second highest bidder, or 110. Contractor 
I would then calculate the time and price given this utility 
that would gain him the maximum profit. This would result in: 
Max Profit = (P - 40) * (T - 30) 
s.t. (60 - P) * (91 - T) = 110 
Solving this graphically in Figure 3-4 yields Profit = $597 
with P = $53.90 and T = 73. 
Thus the overall gain to the government is the increase 
in utility from 2 0 under the naive approach to 110 under the 
Mark Johnson mechanism. 
By this we found that the contractor would charge a price 
of $53.90 and deliver the goods in 73 days.  Although this is 
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$13.90 higher than the price under the naive approach, it also 
gives a 17 day quicker delivery, resulting in the higher 
utility. Even though the "best case" scenario was considered 
for the naive approach, and the contractor received much more 
than his reservation level of profit ($597 vs. $100) , the 
government still had a noticeable gain in utility. 
In this example, the advantage of the Mark Johnson 
mechanism is clear, but under what circumstances could it 
actually be applied? 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF USING THE MODELS IN DOD PROCUREMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze the areas of potential use for 
the multi-attribute analysis mechanisms, specifically 
addressing the usefulness of the Mark Johnson variation as 
applied to source selection, contract award, contract 
modifications and finally to cost effectiveness improvements. 
The imperatives necessary for successful execution of these 
mechanisms and some short and long range implementation issues 
will also be analyzed. 
B. POTENTIAL  USES  OF  THE  MARK  JOHNSON  MODEL  IN  DOD 
CONTRACTING 
The Mark Johnson mechanism has its strength in the fact 
that the marginal tradeoffs between key attributes are set 
equal at the optimal solution by both the government and the 
contractor.  This marginalism results in the most efficient 
solution.  This is not to say that this mechanism is a panacea 
for the contracting world.  In the areas in which it has its 
strengths, it is one of the best, however, it does have 
certain limitations that must also be addressed.   The 
following four subsections will analyze several areas in which 
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1.   Contract Award 
As shown in Chapter III, an award based on the Mark 
Johnson mechanism is plausible and would be prudent in certain 
circumstances. There are, however, several factors that are 
paramount to the successful implementation of this mechanism. 
a.   Effective Competition 
When there is not much competition, or when there is 
a contractor that has an extreme technological advantage in 
one or more key attributes due to economies of scale or 
technical expertise, this mechanism is not efficient due to 
the Vickrey Auction aspect. By allowing the contractor to 
produce at the second highest bidder's utility value, the 
government may give away more than they gain. In these type 
of situations, a mechanism such as the Baron/Myerson mechanism 
could be-much more beneficial in maximizing the government's 
expected gain. 
Jb.   Government Estimates 
In order to effectively use this mechanism, 
government estimates for its own utility would need to be 
made. Once determined, these benefits should be made public. 
If the benefit added by certain attributes is vague, then the 
added utility of those attributes should remain vague. 
The government estimate would then serve as a 
starting point for developing the utility function.   The 
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government estimate could serve as a set utility of say 100. 
From  this,  indifference  curves  could be  developed by 
determining the value of trading off each attribute.  For 
example, if the government estimate is $100K and 90 days, the 
value associated with a completion of 80 days could be 
estimated at $105K.  By continuing this tradeoff analysis, 
parallel indifference curves could be superimposed and used to 
develop the actual utility functions.  Obviously this gets 
much more complicated as more attributes are added.  Graphical 
analysis would fail with more than three attributes, but a 
mathematical representation could still be developed. 
c.       Determining the Utility Function 
The  government  must  be  able  to  determine  a 
quantitative utility function that adequately describes the 
tradeoffs between the key attributes. 
Before the utility function can even be developed, 
the government must determine what attributes are key to the 
contract. An obvious starting point is always price because 
it is the easiest to quantify. It also has controlling 
factors due to budget constraints. Other items that could be 
considered are time (or timeliness), quality, reliability and 
quantity. Of these, only time is an easily quantifiable item, 
as demonstrated in the example. Quality and reliability are 
both after-the-fact attributes.  These both give high risk to 
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the contractor due to the uncertainty inherent in them. By- 
quantifying these items, the contractor's payment and hence 
his profit will be undetermined until the time these 
attributes are tested. This would give incentive to the 
contractor to perform his own testing and modifications until 
his marginal cost of testing was equal to the marginal 
increase in payment. Again this is an efficient solution. By 
increasing the contractor's incentive to increase reliability 
and quality, innovation and efficiency will be motivated. 
In most attributes there is a minimum acceptable 
value (quality, reliability and quantity) and for some there 
may be maximum acceptable values (price and time). Due to 
budgetary constraints, the price will usually have a ceiling. 
Although the tendency to lower the ceiling to the original 
government estimate might exist, it is not recommended. By 
lowering the ceiling, the most likely result would be an end 
point solution given by the contractor. If the government had 
set a maximum price of $45.00 in the Mark Johnson example in 
Chapter III, then the contractors would have bid 85 days and 
50 days respectively, giving a utility of 90 and 615 
respectively to the government. This end point solution 
clearly is inferior because the new utility award level would 
be at 90, whereas a utility of 110 was achieved without a 
ceiling.  Even with the ceiling imposed, the Mark Johnson 
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mechanism was efficient in that the highest possible utility- 
was achieved given the budgetary constraint, however, a 
relaxed budgetary constraint could have resulted in an even 
higher utility. 
Minimum acceptable values for attributes such as 
quality could also result in an end point solution if set too 
low. This is not to say that minimums and maximums should not 
be set. At times they are required by statute or by mission 
requirements. Truly effective utility functions could factor 
minimum and maximum values into the utility functions, such as 
the term (91 - T) in the example. If time goes over 90 days, 
then this term is no longer positive. A requirement that each 
term be positive could be included with the function which 
would effectively set the maximum allowable time without 
having to also specify a ceiling. 
Determining realistic tradeoffs between the key 
attributes will prove to be the greatest challenge in 
specifying a utility function. The signals sent through these 
tradeoffs should ideally align the contractor to the 
government's thinking on the desirability of certain traits. 
Overemphasizing certain criteria could, however, result in an 
efficient, but ineffectual contract award. 
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d. Government Believability 
The success of this mechanism would depend largely 
on the believability of the government by the contractors. 
Deviating from the agreed-on award mechanism or posted utility 
function would foster discontent and would very likely lead to 
deflated utility bids or even the withdrawal of some 
contractors from the bidding pool. 
e. Degree of Risk 
As was stated in Chapter II, the Truth in 
Negotiations Act specifies that the contractor is supposed to 
tell the truth regarding costs and pricing data. But when 
there is uncertainty facing the contractor about the actual 
costs or tradeoff values because only projections are being 
used, the TINA becomes an ineffectual tool. By increasing the 
risk the contractor faces, he will generally become 
conservative regarding what he can actually perform. In an 
attempt to both get the maximum performance and the minimum 
payment, the government is putting the contractor in a very 
tenuous situation. Therefore, the more certain a contractor 
is regarding his tradeoff values, the more truthful he can be 
and is expected to be. 
f. Penalties for Nonperformance 
Although it may seem that the government should then 
back down on their demands in order to alleviate some of the 
40 
. t eliev ility 
he ccess f t i  echani  ould e e  l l  
 t  eli abilit  f t  ver ent  t  ntractors. 
eviati  o   r -  ar  echani  r ost  til  
ct  oul  st r i nt nt  oul  er  l    
efl  til  i s r   it r al f e 
ntr ct rs o   i i  ool. 
.    
s as   hapter ,  r t   
egotiati s ct ecifi  t  ntr t r  s   
ll st  r  t . ut he  
cert i t  tr t r ut t l
st r a ff l s l r j t i
, es t l l.
tr t r s, ill eral
s r at hat l .
tem t t t a m orm i im
ent, ent t n t t  
en tu . eref re, or  t t
ra f l s, or ru l
.
l ho eem h n e t h
o le o h
 
risk to the contractor, this would be counterproductive to the 
process. The contractors must be forced to abide by their 
bids in order for credibility to be formed. In the example in 
Chapter III, if the goods were delivered in 81 days then the 
contractor would only be paid $49.00, regardless of his 
percentage completion at the originally agreed upon 73 days. 
This is due to the requirement to still yield a utility of 
110. Therefore, the penalty incurred by the contractor would 
be equal to the lost utility by the government. This marginal 
approach is much more efficient than the presently used 
liquidated damages clause in construction contracts because 
the government actually gets the "true" liquidated damages 
amount based on their calculated utility function vis-ä-vis 
receiving a set dollar amount per day regardless of the number 
of days.. 
Thus with these imperatives addressed, the Mark 
Johnson mechanism could be employed in a contract award. 
Another area with potential usage of a variation of the 
mechanism is in the realm of source selection. 
2.   Source Selection 
In many circumstances it is desirable to selectively pick 
the source for fulfilling a contract. One such example is in 
the area of professional services contracts. NAVFAC uses a 
source selection process to select the professional services 
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of Architect and Engineering firms for developing designs for 
new construction projects. The attributes involved in this 
selection process make this an ideal candidate for the use of 
a multi-attribute model. 
a.   The Solicitation 
The Brooks Architect and Engineer Act of 1972 stated 
that Architect and Engineering services were to be awarded 
based on demonstrated competence and qualification for the 
required services at fair and reasonable prices. When the 
need for a new construction project is first conceived and 
initial technical data gathered, a synopsis of the proposed 
project is posted in the Commerce Business Daily, detailing 
the 5 to 7 criteria or critical elements considered necessary 
for a qualifying firm to possess in order to successfully 
complete the project. These criteria are the key attributes 
that will be used to determine the most qualified contractor. 
The most qualified firm is required to be awarded the contract 
as long as fair and reasonable prices can be negotiated. 
The synopsis lists a description of the project to 
be undertaken as well as an anticipated price range for the 
project. Also listed is the criteria on which the contractors 
will be evaluated to determine the most qualified firm. These 
criteria are generally listed in the order of importance to 
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the government.  Among common criteria or critical elements 
used are: 
Recent specialized experience 
Professional qualifications of the staff 
Ability  to  complete  project  within  time 
constraints 
Past performance on related contracts 
Geographic location 
Volume of DoD work recently completed 
b.        The Slating Process 
For many years NAVFAC promoted a two-stage process 
for the selection of the contractor to whom the award would be 
made. The first stage was the weeding-out phase, in which the 
field of potential contractors would be narrowed to 3, as per 
the 1972 Act. The second phase would be the review of those 
contractors on the selected criteria. Once the "best" 
contractor was determined, detailed reports indicating the 
reasons why each of the unsuccessful bidders was not chosen 
would be given. Generally, the criteria are parsed through in 
order, dropping out contractors that are not qualified or are 
weak in the earlier or more important criteria. [Ref. 13] 
This system seems to work, as there have been few 
protests. However, this is likely due to the subjective 
nature of these awards. It would be very hard for a company 
to prove they were better than another in any tangible way 
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when the selection criteria are so vague. This flexibility- 
does give the government an extreme advantage in that they can 
weed out contractors who are not easy to work with. If a 
contractor does protest, then they will most likely be 
shuffled to the bottom of the stack in the future. This 
threat not only keeps contractors from protesting, but also 
gives them big incentives to work with the contracting officer 
on their current contracts. 
c. Drawbacks of the Current System 
One problem of this system is the lack of 
consideration of price in the critical elements. The 1972 Act 
specifically states that the most qualified firm is to receive 
the award as long as a fair and reasonable price can be 
negotiated. Although this may be an effective way of 
determining the most qualified contractor without the 
influence of price, it is not efficient. The "fairness and 
reasonableness" of the price can not be determined in a 
competitive sense. A comparison of the price versus the 
government estimate may lend some credibility to its 
reasonableness, but only the market can truly make that 
determination. A much better approach to the reasonableness 
question would be to include price as one of the critical 
elements.  By weighting it with the rest of the elements, it 
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would not have overriding tendencies, but could ensure that 
the prices are reasonable. 
Another problem with this system is also one of its 
greatest strengths. It is extremely subjective at all levels. 
The slating board can disagree on which contractor they think 
is the best overall and there is no way to rectify this 
situation. There are no concrete weighting criteria that 
specify the relative importance of each element because all of 
the elements are qualitative without any quantitative 
correspondence. By applying a variation of the Mark Johnson 
mechanism, some of the subjectivity can be removed by turning 
the qualitative reviews into quantitative ones. 
d.       Applying the Mark Johnson Mechanism 
By developing a utility function from the key 
elements and a scoring range for each of those elements, the 
board can come up with a system for dealing with these 
differences in opinion. This utility function should be 
developed when the key elements are first determined and prior 
to the opening of the various contractors proposals. 
The simplest form of utility function would have the 
factors equally weighted, thereby yielding a utility of the 
sum of each of the rated attributes. For most circumstances, 
this would not be sufficient because each attribute does not 
carry the same importance.  For example, the distance a firm 
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is away from the site of the project is usually not as 
important as the number of civil engineers to be dedicated to 
the project. There are also some elements that appear to be 
binary in nature, but have unstated ranges associated with 
them. By exceeding a certain minimum criteria, the firm will 
be considered, while the magnitude by which the firm exceeds 
the minimum has little differential effect. For example, if 
the criteria was that the firm must have at least 3 years 
experience, a firm with 20 years would be better than one with 
5 or 10, but would be considered the same as one with 18 or 19 
years. By contriving a point system based on ranges, this 
attribute could be easily incorporated without distorting the 
overall capabilities of a firm. 
This demonstrates that variations of the Mark 
Johnson mechanism can be used in source selection to get the 
most qualified contractor at the most reasonable price. The 
next section will examine the application of the mechanism to 
contract modifications. 
3. Modifications to Existing Contracts 
When a modification to an existing contract is required, 
the contractor assigned the original contract is essentially 
getting a sole-source contract. Due to the lack of 
competition in this, the straight Mark Johnson mechanism would 
be of little use since its award structure is based on the 
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second highest bidder. However, the utility function part of 
the mechanism can still be employed to give the contractor the 
flexibility to maximize the gain to the government. Obviously 
the government wants to get the additional work done for as 
little money as possible, but again money is not the only 
thing that adds benefit to the government. 
An example of this would be a contractor doing a 
renovation of some barracks when an unforseen site condition 
is discovered, the existence of asbestos in some of the walls. 
This would require a modification to the contract in order for 
the asbestos to be removed and would generally also result in 
a time extension to the contract being given if it can be 
shown that this additional work would impact the critical path 
of completing the contract. Since most renovation projects 
have liquidated damages averaging about $1000 per day, the 
amount of the time extension can be critical to the contractor 
in maintaining an adequate profit level. But if the actual 
amount lost to the government will be less than $1000/day then 
it would be beneficial if they could somehow trade off some 
days for some additional work. If the contractor is running 
behind for whatever reason, he may be more than willing to 
trade some work for days. By establishing a utility function 
that sets the relationship between these values based on the 
government's  estimate of how long  it  should take the 
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contractor, and how much it should cost, the government can 
give the flexibility to the contractor. This added 
flexibility will allow the contractor to give the same utility 
to the government, while allowing him to maximize his benefit 
as well. Thus, the government can set a higher required 
utility than would normally be possible just by giving some 
flexibility to the contractor. 
By using the utility maximizing aspect of the Mark 
Johnson mechanism and giving some flexibility to the 
contractor, the government can increase their utility received 
through contract modifications. The last area of potential 
use that will be analyzed is that of platform performance 
improvements. 
4.   Cost Effectiveness Improvements 
Whenever improvements are considered for current 
aircraft, ships or other major weapons systems, all major 
subsystems that add to the improvement must be considered. 
These subsystems are similar to the key attributes in the 
previous analyses. Cost Effectiveness Improvement Programs 
are currently undertaken using multiple attribute analysis of 
the subsystems to achieve the best improvement package given 
a funding constraint. 
To accomplish this, experts on each of the subsystems are 
gathered in order to get realistic information regarding the 
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costs and improvement levels possible in each of these areas. 
At this time, a matrix is laid out containing one row for each 
of the subsystems, and one column for each of the possible 
improvement levels for each of these systems. Next, the 
relative importance of each of the subsystems is determined 
and a weighting factor (WF) is assigned and entered into the 
matrix. The experts then assign Benefit Values (BV) to each 
of the possible improvements of their subsystems with the 
baseline or status quo configuration having a BV of 0, the 
ultimate improvement having a BV of 100, and the intermediate 
improvements having BV's between the two. 
The next step is to conduct cost analysis of each of the 
improvement levels for each subsystem. These values are then 
inserted into the matrix at their corresponding improvement 
levels. This effectively accomplishes a double weighting 
system between improvement areas and improvement levels. 
Once the matrix has been completed, Benefit Points are 
calculated by multiplying the WF by the BV's and dividing by 
the cost for each cell. The cell giving the highest Benefit 
Points is the subsystem improvement that gives the highest 
marginal benefit for the least marginal cost. At this time, 
the "Optimal Pareto Frontier" is determined by first plotting 
the cost of this improvement with the benefit associated with 
it (determined by WF * BV).  Subsequent steps on the optimal 
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frontier are then plotted by taking the subsystem improvement 
with the next highest Benefit Points and plotting it's 
additional cost with it's additional benefit, thereby giving 
the cumulative cost and benefit derived. 
Finally, the procedure is repeated for the subsystem 
improvements that give the least Benefit Points, thereby 
creating the envelope of possible improvements. At this time, 
the budgetary constraint can be plotted and the package of 
subsystem improvements within the budget that yield the 
highest benefit can be determined. 
Table 4-1 demonstrates the application of this method 
with the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Design Project. 
Figure 4-1 shows the "Optimal Pareto Frontier" and the envelope 
of possible packages along with the budgetary constraint of 
$625 for the project. Under that constraint, the optimal 
package is found to be: 
Level 1 improvement to Velocity for $50K 
Level 3 improvement to Payload for $150K 
Level 3 improvement to Guidance for $2 00K 
Level 2 improvement to Engagement for $100K 
Level 2 improvement to Reliability for $50K 
Level 2 improvement to Maintainability for $70K 
These improvements cost a total of $62 OK and yield an 
improvement benefit of 82% of maximum.   This compares 
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favorably with the $1070K that would have been expended for 
the maximum (100%) improvement benefit of all subsystems. 
The major contribution of this method is not simply 
in the mathematics, but from the insights gained through the 
processes of discussion and consensus building in constructing 
the matrix. The success of this technique can only be 
achieved through the presence of an impartial facilitator who 
can effectively lead the concerted effort of a group of 
"subject matter experts" to develop a realistic tradeoff 
analysis based on all of the background facts. This 
application is most applicable when there are major budgetary 
constraints and it is unclear if a reasonable solution is 
attainable. 
The benefits of this type of decision process are: 
• Provides a common yardstick to evaluate competing 
systems having dissimilar benefits 
• Displays the relative overall cost and benefit of 
any one design compared to other designs 
• Displays the variables and levels that comprise 
the best design for any given level of the 
overall resource expenditure 
• Compares different designs proposed by the 
decision makers with more efficient designs, that 
either cost less and provide the same overall 
benefit, or provide more benefit for the same 
cost 
• Group effort vice individual judgement 
51 
it t oul
a m 10 ) ent efit l s.
aj r t t et t l
athe atics, t rom t o
i st t
atri . e l
o parti l i
cert rt  
 t a t r ert l  li ra f
l si l t . hi
li ost l l he aj r get
str i t cl r ·· l
l .
efit i :
 r i  r st l t peti
e i i il efit
 is l erall st efit
o par r
 is l r l l t pri
st l
erall endit r
 pares i t
i akers it or t si s, t
st i erall
nefit, i or efit
st



















































































Table 4-1 Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Design Project 
after Reference 14 
1. Velocity is in terms of Mach (times the speed of sound) with 
Baseline =1.8, Lvl 1 = 2.0, Lvl 2 = 2.4, Lvl 3 = 2.8 
2. Payload is in lbs with Baseline = 300, Lvl 1 = 500, Lvl 2 = 800, Lvl 
3 = 1000, Lvl 4 = 1400 
3. Guidance is radius to target in meters with Baseline = ±200, Lvl 1 
= ±50, Lvl 2 = ±10, Lvl 3 = ±0 
4. Cooperative Engagement is various add on systems to enhance remote 
operation with Baseline = None, Lvl 1 = Attack Warning, Lvl 2 = Near 
Real Time, Lvl 3 = Real Time 
5. Reliability is mean time between failures measured in hours of 
flight with Baseline = 200, Lvl 1 = 400, Lvl 2 = 800, Lvl 3 = 1200 
6. Maintainability is mean time to repair measured in minutes with 
Baseline = 60, Lvl 1 = 45, Lvl 2 = 30 
7. This cell represents the level 1 improvement to velocity system with 
a speed of M2.0, a cost of $50K and Benefit Points of 45 
8. This cell represents the level 3 improvement to the Payload with a 
payload of lOOOlbs., a cost of $150K and Benefit Points of 80 
9 . This cell represents the level 3 improvement to the Guidance system 
with a radius of ±0m, a cost of $200k and Benefit Points of 100 
10. This cell represents the level 2 improvement to the Cooperative 
Engagement system to Near Real Time, a cost of $100K and Benefit 
Points of 80 
11. This cell represents the level 2 improvement of reliability to 800 
flight hours between failures, a cost of $50K and Benefit Points of 
80 , . 
12. This cell represents the level 2 improvement to the maintainability 
with a mean time to repair of 30 minutes, a cost of $70K and Benefit 
Points of 100 
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The largest weakness of this method of analysis is the 
fact that the costs associated with each improvement level for 
each subsystem are considered independent. This may be true 
in some areas, however, it is definitely not true in all 
areas. In the example, the increase in payload will very 
likely impact the cost to increase the velocity of the 
missile. The reliability of the missile will very likely 
effect its repairability. By not addressing this 
interdependence, the static costs established in the matrix 
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Utilizing the utility function of the Mark Johnson 
mechanism would allow all of the tradeoffs to be incorporated. 
By using the experts to establish a utility function based on 
the subsystem improvements, a truly optimal solution can be 
found given the budget constraint. Because a multiple 
attribute mechanism is already being employed in this area, 
the transition to the use of the Mark Johnson mechanism might 
meet with little resistance. 
The last four subsections analyzed areas in which the 
Mark Johnson mechanism could be used in government 
contracting. There are however, initial as well as long term 
obstacles that must be overcome in order to successfully 
implement this new technique. 
C.   IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
As with any new system, there are costs associated with 
the transition into their use. For the implementation of this 
mechanism, there are both initial start up costs as well as 
long term costs. 
1.   Initial start up costs 
There would be a large potential for increased 
Termination for Defaults on contracts awarded under this 
mechanism at the onset. This would be due to contractors not 
understanding the mechanism, or trying to game the system. To 
gain credibility, the government must stand by its decisions. 
54 
tili  t  tili  f cti  f t  ark J s  
echani  ould l o  ll f t  t offs t  e i r orated. 
y si  t  perts t  st li  til  ct  as   
 e  i prove ents,  ti al l t   e 
 i   dget nstraint. ecause ulti l  
t t  echani   l  ei  pl e   i  r a, 
 si    s  f  ark  echani  ight 
eet it   e. 
he t r secti s l    hi   
ar   echa i  l     ent 
ntr cti . her  ever, it l ell  r
st l  t ust  o   r essf ll  
l ent i e.
. I
s it e , st i it
ra io i . r l entati
echani , t i t st ell
o erm st .
. i l
r oul  a t ti l n e
i at efault t t
e sm h set. i l t t
r a n h ec a i , ryin o h te .
i ili , h n e t ust tan i .
4 
However, whenever a new mechanism is employed, there is a 
tendency to test whether the stated objectives are really what 
the government desires. By maintaining a strict minimum in 
allowable utility, there is a great possibility before the 
method is completely understood that contractors will not 
realize the magnitude of the financial impact of non- 
compliance. The current use of liquidated damages per day are 
easily calculated and their effects are understood. But the 
advent of liquidated damages being assessed by the actual 
decline in utility may leave the contractors perplexed. 
Before the public completely understands the concept, 
there is potential for increased reports of waste, fraud and 
abuse. Since price will no longer be the one driving force, 
there will be times when the public sees that the government 
is paying more than it absolutely has to. The fact that extra 
is being paid, but for extra utility in the form of quality, 
reliability, timeliness, etc., may not be fully understood. 
As the public becomes aware of the new policy and sees the 
shift towards the way private industry already operates, this 
problem should go away. 
2.   Long Term Costs 
As with any cost cutting scheme, there is a very real 
potential to reduce the number of contractors willing to 
perform defense contracts.  If a firm cannot make at least its 
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reservation level of profit then it will cease to be a going 
concern. This is obviously of great concern if the contractor 
cannot complete a contract already undertaken because of the 
long delay in reprocurement and the increased costs involved. 
It is also of concern in the long run because, as fewer 
contractors are willing to take on defense jobs, the reduced 
competition aspect will inevitably increase the price and 
decrease the utility the government will get. The fewer the 
contractors, the larger the gap between the highest and second 
highest bidder, which means the lower the ultimate benefit 
received. For this reason competition is desired, but the 
very nature of decreasing profits causes a reduction in 
competition. As has been stated earlier, the Vickrey Auction 
is not necessarily efficient in the face of reduced 
competition. Only if the remaining contractors are close in 
their abilities in the key attributes will they submit utility 
bids close together. The farther these bids are apart, the 
less the government gains through the use of this mechanism. 
3.  Other Issues 
As with any new system, there is always a tremendous 
built-in bias towards the present system and any proposed 
deviation will inevitably meet with resistance. Because of 
this resistance, large scale use of this mechanism would not 
be prudent until an assorted base of contractors that both 
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understand the system and believe the government can be 
established.  Testing this mechanism on a small scale could 
demonstrate the actual benefits received by the government and 
gain valuable advocates. 
D.   SUMMARY 
The best way to maximize the understanding between the 
contractor and the government is to be in constant contact 
with the suppliers. When the contractors know what the 
government is trying to accomplish and why, they often have 
value added exercises they can perform that cost them little 
or nothing but go a long way in increasing the government's 
utility. Whenever flexibility is given up, the price will be 
higher. As long as the moral hazard issue is not involved, 
rigidity in contracting does not make sense. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In order for the Department of Defense to maintain its 
effectiveness in this time of relative peace, new mechanisms 
must be explored that will allow for both efficient and 
effective allocation of scarce resources. This thesis has 
shown that the Mark Johnson model of multiple attribute 
analysis can be applied as such a tool. 
Although this mechanism is not the silver bullet for 
solving all of the DOD's acquisition problems, it does have 
potential for use in many different facets of the process. As 
long as adequate competition does exist, and the imperatives 
for its application are carefully addressed, the mechanism can 
prove to be a valuable addition to the acquisition workforces 
toolbox. In the absence of competition, it can still be 
useful for indicating to the contractor the value attributes 
other than price add to the government, and can thereby allow 
the contractor the flexibility to increase the government's 
gain. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The only way to ascertain whether the mechanism would 
truly work in a real acquisition situation would be to test it 
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program on a small scale to test its viability in certain 
settings. Through this limited application, the advantages of 
such a tool will become apparent and proponents will develop. 
This will also provide a core of trained personnel who 
understand the mechanism and can promote its usage in other 
areas. 
C.   ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Q: How can the Mark Johnson model be used in DOD 
contracting to increase the overall gain to the government? 
A: By indicating to the contractor the key attributes 
(and their tradeoffs) that give benefit to the government and 
giving the contractor both the incentive and the flexibility 
to maximize those attributes, the overall gain to the 
government will be increased. 
Q: ■ What attributes should be considered key to a 
project? 
A: Any attribute that can be readily identified as 
adding to or multiplying the benefit the DOD receives. These 
attributes may include, but are not limited to price, quality, 
reliability and timeliness. 
Q: How can a relationship between the key elements be 
defined? 
A: The easiest way to define the relationship is to fix 
all attributes at a certain level to establish a baseline. 
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From this point one of the attributes should be varied asking 
what would have to happen to the other attributes in order to 
maintain the same level of desirability as at the baseline. 
By establishing the tradeoff characteristics of the 
attributes, the relationship can be formally defined. 
Q: Will streamlined contracting methods affect the 
availability of DOD contractors in the long run? 
A: Maybe. The objective of the streamlining is to 
reduce the amount of regulations and oversight required in the 
contracting field. This ultimately should decrease the 
restrictions imposed on contractors and thereby increase the 
number of contractors willing to perform DOD contracts. 
However, as the DOD decreases the number of contracts let and 
mechanisms for limiting contractors profit levels are 
employed,- the inefficient contractors will drop out of the DOD 
contracting arena, thereby decreasing the contracting base. 
The net effect of the increases and decreases is unknown, 
however, only the efficient firms will remain. 
Q: Can the Baron/Myerson truth telling model be used 
with multiple attributes? 
A: Yes. Presently the Baron/Myerson model addresses 
the attributes of Price and Quantity, both of which must be 
flexible in order for the model to be used.  The model could 
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also be applied to price and any other attribute, but in its 
present form cannot be used with more than two attributes. 
D.   SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas merit further research. 
1. The weakness of the Vickrey Auction in an area with 
little competition needs to be addressed. Developing a truth 
telling mechanism that is efficient in this environment is 
critical to the success of the Mark Johnson model. By 
altering the Baron/Myers on mechanism to include more than two 
attributes, and combining it with the utility function of the 
Mark Johnson model, the advantages of both models could be 
expounded. Research could be conducted into developing an 
effective combination of these two models. 
2. This research examined four areas in which multiple 
attributes analysis was applicable and in which the Mark 
Johnson model could be employed. Further work could be done 
on expanding the application to other areas of the acquisition 
process. 
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